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Abstract—In contrast to its wired counterpart, wireless com-
munication is highly susceptible to eavesdropping due to the
broadcast nature of the wireless propagation medium. Recent
works have proposed the use of interference to reduce eaves-
dropping capabilities in wireless wiretap networks. However, the
concurrent effect of interference on both eavesdropping receivers
(ERs) and legitimate receivers (LRs) has not been thoroughly
investigated, and carefully engineering the network interference
is required to harness the full potential of interference for wireless
secrecy. This two part paper addresses this issue by proposing a
generalized interference alignment (GIA) technique, which jointly
designs the transceivers at the legitimate partners to impede the
ERs without interfering with LRs. In Part I, we have established
a theoretical framework for the GIA technique. In Part II, we
will first propose an efficient GIA algorithm that is applicable
to large-scale networks and then evaluate the performance of
this algorithm in stochastic wireless wiretap network via both
analysis and simulation. These results reveal insights into when
and how GIA contributes to wireless secrecy.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Survey
The ability to exchange confidential messages securely
in wireless network has become increasingly important for
modern information society. However, in contrast to its wired
counterpart, wireless transmission is highly susceptible to
eavesdropping due to the broadcast nature of the wireless prop-
agation medium [1]. Contemporary wireless security systems,
based on cryptographic primitives, evolved from schemes
developed for traditional wireline applications. To overcome
challenges associated with broadcast communication, one must
augment contemporary wireless security techniques using
strategies that exploit the intrinsic properties of the wireless
propagation medium.
A key observation in exploiting these properties is that
the broadcast nature generates contrasting effects: It makes
the secrecy information from a certain legitimate transmitter
(LT) vulnerable to malicious interception, but at the same
time enables other legitimate partners to impede the ERs via
interference. Therefore, interference emerges as a potentially
valuable resource for wireless network secrecy [2]. The idea
of enhancing network secrecy through the use of interference
has been investigated in several recent works, under the name
of artificial noise [3], [4], artificial noise alignment [5], [6],
friendly jamming [7], [8], or cooperative jamming [9]–[12]. A
major challenge in utilizing interference to enhance secrecy is
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that while impeding the ERs, interference affects the LRs as
well. Hence, without proper coordination, interference may
be of little help or even harmful to wireless secrecy in
some network configurations [8]. We envision that a greater
secrecy gain will be achieved by simultaneously coordinating
multiple legitimate partners such that aggregated interference
causes negligible effects at the LRs while impeding ERs.
This motivates the need to develop coordinative interference
engineering strategies for wireless wiretap networks, which
will be referred to as wireless-tap networks.1
Several secrecy-enhancing interference engineering strate-
gies have been proposed for small networks with one LT
[5], [6], [8], [9] or one LR [7], [10]–[12]. Coordinating
aggregated interference from multiple LTs at multiple LRs
imposes new challenges on secrecy transmission strategy
design. A promising candidate to overcome this challenge is
interference alignment (IA) [13]. A few studies have adopted
the IA scheme proposed in [13] to promote wireless secrecy
[14]–[16]. However, the scheme in [13] is based on infinite
dimensional symbols that require time or frequency domain
symbol extension, making it difficult to implement in practice.
To avoid the infinite dimension issue, researchers have
developed spatial-domain IA techniques, in which no symbol
extension is involved and interference is coordinated and
canceled via the finite signal dimension provided by multiple
antennas [17], [18]. In Part I, a theoretical framework has been
established to address the two key issues of spatial-domain IA,
i.e., feasibility conditions and transceiver design. Moreover, to
further enhance the network’s capability of secrecy protection,
legitimate jammers (LJs) are incorporated to better impede
ERs without interfering with the LRs. In this paper, this
technique is referred to as GIA. To apply the GIA technique
to practical wireless-tap networks, the following issues need
to be addressed:
• Design effective scalable GIA algorithm: In large-scale
networks, the limited policy space in transceiver design
is insufficient to cancel interference on all cross links.
Existing works applying IA to large-scale networks [19],
[20] address this issue by first dividing a large network
into small clusters and then performing IA separately
on each cluster. However, under this approach, the inter-
cluster interference is not addressed, and some of it may
be the strongest interference perceived by the LRs on
a cluster edge. On the other hand, if every LR wishes
to cancel the strongest interference it perceives, the
1 “wireless wiretap” is referred to as “wireless-tap” to emphasize the
wireless nature of the propagation medium.
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2feasibility conditions of the entire network are coupled
together, which normally requires centralized approaches
that are not applicable to large networks. Hence, design-
ing effective scalable GIA algorithms is difficult.
• Characterize the performance of GIA in stochastic
networks: To obtain insights into the performance of
GIA in generic wireless-tap networks, it is desirable to
characterize how GIA performs in large-scale stochastic
wireless-tap networks. A few works have analyzed the
performance of stochastic networks with interference
control [21], [22]. In these works, the interference control
policies at different nodes are independent. However, with
GIA, the interference control policies at different LTs
and LJs become correlated, making it difficult to quantify
aggregate interference at LRs and ERs. Therefore, char-
acterizing the performance of GIA in stochastic networks
is challenging.
B. Contribution of This Work
In this work, we will address the challenges listed above.
We consider MIMO wireless-tap networks with LJs. To enable
the design of effective and scalable GIA algorithms, we first
decompose the GIA feasibility conditions to per-node basis.
Based on that, we propose an algorithm that generates a
feasible alignment set by only requiring each legitimate node
to communicate with a few nodes, the number of which
does not scale with the size of the network. This algorithm,
together with the distributive GIA transceiver design algorithm
proposed in Part I, construct a GIA algorithm that is applicable
to large-scale wireless-tap networks. We then characterize the
performance of the proposed algorithm in stochastic wireless-
tap networks. We jointly adopt Cauchy–Schwarz inequality,
Chebyshev inequality, and Chernoff inequality to bound the ef-
fect of aggregate interference from multiple correlated sources,
and obtain the performance of GIA. This result demonstrates
the contribution of GIA to network secrecy enhancement. It
also illustrates how major network parameters, such as node
density and antenna configuration, affect the performance of
wireless-tap networks. We also perform various simulations to
obtain insights into when and the how GIA technique benefits
network secrecy.
C. Organization
Section II formulates the alignment set design problem. Sec-
tion III proposes a distributive alignment set design algorithm.
Section IV analyzes the performance of the proposed algo-
rithm in large-scale stochastic wireless-tap networks. Section
V provides numerical results. Section VI concludes.
D. Notations
1) General: a, a, A, and A represent scalar, vector, matrix,
and set/space, respectively. N, Z, R and C denote the set
of natural numbers, integers, real numbers, and complex
numbers, respectively.
2) Functions: Function [·]+ = max{·, 0}, Γ(·) and Γ(·, ·)
are the gamma function and incomplete gamma function,
respectively. n|m denotes that n divides m, and n mod m
denotes n modulo m, n,m ∈ Z. b·c denotes the floor function.
I{·} is the indicator function.
(
n
m
)
is the Binomial coefficient
with parameters n,m ∈ N. |a| represents the absolute value
of scalar a, and |A| represents the cardinality of set A.
3) Linear algebra: The operators (·)T, (¯·), (·)H, rank(·), ||·
||F, trace(·), denote transpose, complex conjugate, Hermitian
transpose, rank, Frobenius norm, trace of a matrix. span(A)
and span({a}) denote the linear space spanned by the column
vectors of A and the vectors in set {a}, respectively. dim(·)
denotes the dimension of a space. diag(A, . . . ,X) represents
a block diagonal matrix with submatrices A, . . . ,X.
4) Probability theory: The operators E{·}, V{·}, and S{·}
denote the expectation, variance, and standard deviation of
a random variable, and Pr{·} denotes the probability of an
event. Nc(µ, σ2) represents complex Gaussian distribution,
with mean µ and standard deviation σ.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we will first describe the system model of
wireless-tap networks, then illustrate the potential benefits of
GIA via a case study, and finally formulate the alignment set
design problem of GIA.
A. System Model
Consider a network consisting of K LT-LR pairs, J LJs and
K ERs (The LTs and LJs are indexed from 1 to K and from
K+1 to K+J , respectively.). Suppose LT j (or LJ j, if j >
K), LR k, and ER k are equipped with Mj , N
(` )
k , and N
(e)
k
antennas, respectively. At each time slot, LT (or LJ) j sends
dj independent symbols. LT k attempts to send confidential
messages to LR k, while ER k attempts to intercept these
messages. LJ j transmits dummy data to generate interference.
The received signals y(` )k ,y
(e)
k ∈ Cdk at LR k and ER k are
given by
y
(ι)
k = (U
(ι)
k )
H
(
H
(ι)
kkVkxk +
K˜∑
j=1,6=k
H
(ι)
kjVjxj + z
(ι)
k
)
, (1)
where K˜ = K + J , H(ι)kj ∈ CN
(ι)
k ×Mj , ι ∈ {`, e} are
the channel matrices from LT (or LJ) j to LR k or ER
k, whose entries are independent random variables drawn
from continuous distributions; xj ∈ Cdj is the encoded
information symbol at LT (or LJ) j; Vj ∈ CMj×dj is the
precoder at LT (or LJ) j; U(ι)k ∈ CN
(ι)
k ×dk , ι ∈ {`, e}
is the decoder at LR k or ER k; and z(ι)k ∈ CN
(ι)
k ×1,
ι ∈ {`, e} is the white Gaussian noise with zero mean
and unit variance. The transmission power of LT (or
LJ) j is given by Pj = E
{
trace
(
xHj V
H
j Vjxj
)}
.
Define the configuration of the legitimate network
as χ , {(M1,M2, . . . ,MK˜), (N (` )1 , N (` )2 , . . . , N (` )K ),
(d1, d2, . . . , dK˜)}.
This work adopts Information-theoretic security [23] as the
performance metric. From [24], [25], under a given transceiver
3LR 1
LR 2
LR 3LT 3
LT 2
LT 1
LJ 4
ER 3
ER 2
ER 1
Fig. 1. Configuration of the example network.
design, the following secrecy rate RSk is achievable for legiti-
mate link k:
RSk = E
{
[r
(` )
k − r(e)k ]+
}
, (2)
in which r(ι)k , ι ∈ {`, e}, is given by
r
(ι)
k = log2 det
{
I+(U
(ι)
k )
HH
(ι)
kkVk
(
H
(ι)
kkVk
)H
U
(ι)
k[
(U
(ι)
k )
H
(
I+
K˜∑
j=1,6=k
H
(ι)
kjVj
(
H
(ι)
kjVj
)H)
U
(ι)
k
]−1}
. (3)
From [15], when the transmission power at all LTs and LJs
are on the same order, i.e., for some θl, θh > 0,
Pj
P ∈ [θl, θh],∀j, the secure degree of freedom (sDoF) can be defined as
DSk = lim
P→∞
RSk
log2(P )
. (4)
B. Case Study
Example: As illustrated in Fig. 1, consider a MIMO
wireless-tap network, as described in Sec. II-A, with K = 3,
J = 1, antenna configuration Mk = N
(` )
k = 2, k ∈ {1, 2, 3},
M4 = 4, N
(e)
1 = 3, N
(e)
2 = N
(e)
3 = 2, and data stream
configuration dk = 1, k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. The entries of all
the channel matrices are independent random variables drawn
from Nc(0, 1). The transmit power at all nodes is 20dB, i.e.,
Pk = P = 100, k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Compare four different strategies: the first two are non-
cooperative, whereas the other two are cooperative:
A. Zero forcing with 2 active LTs: LT 1, 2 use random
precoders v1, v2,2 and LR 1, 2 use zero forcing to cancel
interference, i.e., u(` )1 = ZH
(` )
12 v2 and u
(` )
2 = ZH
(` )
21 v1,
where Z =
[
0 −1
1 0
]
. To avoid interfering with LR 1 and
2, LT 3 and LJ 4 remain silent, i.e., v3 = 0, v4 = 0.
B. Zero forcing with 3 active LTs: LT 1, 2 and 3 use
random precoders v1, v2 and v3, and LR 1, 2 and 3
use zero forcing to cancel interference from LT 2, 3 and
2Small letters are used for all transceivers as they are vectors in this
example.
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Both LRs and ERs can 
decouple the signal and 
interference. Low se-crecy 
rate and sDoF.
LR 1, 2 and ER 1 can-not 
decouple the signal and 
interference. Low secrecy 
rate and sDoF.
LRs can separate the signal 
from interference and ER 1 
cannot. Mod-erate secrecy 
rate and sDoF.
LRs can separate the signal 
from interference and 
neither ER can. High 
secrecy rate and sDoF.
Strategy
A
B
C
D
 LR 1           ER 1            LR 2             ER 2
(three 
dimension)
signal at LRs/ERs
interference from LTs at LRs/ERs
interference from LJs
 Signal space at:
Fig. 2. Signal space at LR 1, 2 and ER 1, 2 under different strategies.
1, respectively, i.e., u(` )1 = ZH
(` )
12 v2, u
(` )
2 = ZH
(` )
23 v3
and u(` )3 = ZH
(` )
31 v1. LJ 4 remains silent.
C. IA: LT 1–3 adopt IA to design precoders {vk}, k ∈
{1, 2, 3}. Interference at every LR is aligned into a 1-
dimensional subspace. Specifically, v1 is designed to be a
eigenvector of (H(` )31 )
−1H(` )32 (H
(` )
12 )
−1H(` )13 (H
(` )
23 )
−1H(` )21 ,
v2 = (H
(` )
32 )
−1H(` )31 v1, and v3 = (H
(` )
23 )
−1H(` )21 v1. u
(` )
1 ,
u
(` )
2 , and u
(` )
3 are designed as in Strategy B. LJ 4 still
remains silent.
D. GIA: LT 1–3 and LJ 4 adopt a coordinated approach to
design their precoders so that interference at every LR is
aligned to a 1-dimensional subspace. Specifically, the LTs
and LRs design their transceivers as in Strategy C. LJ 4
designs v4 so that v4 ⊥
(
(u
(` )
k )
HH
(` )
k4
)T
, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
This design is feasible as
(
(u
(` )
k )
HH
(` )
k4
)T
, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}
are three vectors in C4.
The signal space at LR 1, 2 and ER 1, 2 as well as the
secrecy rate and sDoF of LR 1, 2 under the above four
strategies are illustrated and compared in Fig. 2.3 From this
figure, Strategy C, D perform better than Strategy A, B. This
is because the channel states between LTs and LRs {H(` )kj } are
independent of those between LTs and ERs {H(e)kj }. Therefore,
interference that is aligned at the LRs is not aligned at the
ERs almost surely. This fact allow the legitimate network to
impede ERs without affecting LRs. Strategy D performs best
as its jointly exploits the capability of all legitimate partners,
i.e., LTs, LRs, and LJs to generate desirable interference.
Remark 2.1 (Practical Issues): It is worth noting that the
GIA technique proposed in the example:
• requires no channel state for the eavesdropping link.
3Because the cases of LR 3/ER 3 are identical to those of LR 2/ER 2 under
Strategy B-D, they are omitted in Fig. 2 for conciseness.
4The transceivers of the legitimate partners are functions
of the channel state of legitimate links, i.e., {H(` )kj }. In
other words, no channel state information (CSI) of the
eavesdropping link, i.e., {H(e)kj } is required.
• is effective even if ERs have all the CSI. The perfor-
mance of Strategy D comes from the unequal dimension
of the interference at the ERs and LRs. Since this property
is due to the fact that the two sets of channel state {H(` )kj }
and {H(e)kj } are independent, it is invariant with respect
to the amount of CSI at the ERs.
These properties greatly improves the practicality of the pro-
posed GIA technique. For instance, the possible leakage of
CSI from the legitimate network to ERs does not affect the
performance of the proposed algorithms.
C. Alignment Set Design
In Sec. II-B, the potential of GIA technique in secrecy
enhancement is demostrated. To cope with the general cases,
the following problem is addressed in Part I :
Problem 2.1 (GIA Transceiver Design): Design transceivers
{U(` )k , Vj}, k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, j ∈ {1, . . . , K˜} that satisfy the
following constraints:
rank
(
(U
(` )
k )
HH
(` )
kkVk
)
= dk, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, (5)
rank (Vj) = dj , ∀j ∈ {K+1, . . . , K˜},(6)
and (U(` )k )
HH
(` )
kjVj = 0, ∀(k, j) ∈ A, (7)
where A ⊆ Aall = {(k, j) : k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, j ∈
{1, . . . , K˜}, k 6= j} is the alignment set. It characterizes the
set of interference to be canceled by GIA.
In Part I, the feasibility conditions of Problem 2.1 is
analyzed for given network configuration χ and alignment set
A. In practice, the network configuration is usually fixed at
prior. Hence, to design feasible GIA strategies, the following
problem needs to be addressed:
Problem 2.2 (Alignment Set Design): Design A so that GIA
is feasible, i.e., Problem 2.1 has solutions.
To develop GIA techniques that are applicable to large-scale
networks, it is important to design algorithms that can solve
Problem 2.2 distributively. However, this task is difficult due
to the the following technical challenge.
Challenge of Coupled Feasibility Conditions
As Corollary 4.3 of Part I shows, for GIA to be feasible,
it is necessary that the number of variables in transceiver
design is no less than the number of constraints for all
subsets of GIA constraints in (7). This fact illustrates
that GIA feasibility conditions are inherently coupled with
each other. Since there are exponentially many subsets of
GIA constraints, the design of a feasible alignment set is
complicated.
III. ALGORITHM DESIGN
In this section, a GIA algorithm will be proposed to solve
Problem 2.2 distributively. To achieve this, we first decompose
the GIA feasibility conditions to per-node basis via Theo-
rem 3.1.
Definition 1 (Proper Alignment Subsets): Alignment sub-
sets A(r)(k) = {(k, j)} ⊆ {k} × ({1, . . . , K˜}\{k}), and
A(t)(j) = {(k, j)} ⊆ ({1, . . . ,K}\{j}) × {j} are proper
iff. ∑
j:(k,j)∈
A(r)(k)
dj ≤ N (` )k − dk,
∑
k:(k,j)∈
A(t)(j)
dk ≤Mj − dj . (8)
Theorem 3.1 (Proper Alignment Subsets Lead to GIA Fea-
sibility): Problem 2.1 is feasible almost surely if the alignment
set A can be covered by proper alignment subsets, i.e.,
A =
( ⋃
k∈{1,...,K}
A(r)(k)
)⋃( ⋃
j∈{1,...,K˜}
A(t)(j)
)
(9)
for some proper alignment subsets A(r)(k) and A(t)(j).
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A for the proof.
Solution to Coupled Feasibility Conditions
Since equation (8) is a set of per-node constraints, The-
orem 3.1 provides a mechanism to decompose the GIA
feasibility constraints to per-node basis. This result enables
legitimate nodes to distributively design the alignment set,
while maintaining the GIA feasibility.
Based on Theorem 3.1, the following algorithm is adopted
to generate alignment set A.
Algorithm 1 (Generate Feasible Alignment Set):
• Alignment set selection at the transmitter side: LT (or
LJ) j selects a few LRs such that A(t)(j) satisfies (8).4
Notify the selected LRs.
• Alignment set selection at the receiver side: LR k
selects among the transmitters which do not select LR
k in the previous step, and make A(r)(k) satisfy (8).
• Generate Alignment Set: Set A according to (9).
Corollary 3.1 (Feasibility of Algorithm 1): In a MIMO
wireless-tap network, when the alignment set A is generated
by Algorithm 1, Problem 2.1 is feasible almost surely.
Proof: This corollary is a direct consequence of Theo-
rem 3.1.
Remark 3.1 (Effective Scalable GIA Algorithm): The free-
dom in designing the alignment subsets, A(t)(j), A(r)(k) in
Algorithm 1 enables the legitimate nodes to distributively
select the strongest interfering links and hence effectively
manage interference. Since the GIA transceiver design algo-
rithm proposed in Part I can also be executed distributively
(please refer to Remark 4.8 of Part I for details), by first
performing Algorithm 1 to design a feasible alignment set
A and then using the algorithm proposed in Part I to design
the transceivers {U(` )k ,Vj}, a distributive GIA algorithm is
obtained. In this algorithm, the number of nodes that each
node need to exchange messages with are determined by the
alignment subsets and hence does not scale with the size of
the network.
4Here node selection criteria is not specified as it does not affect the
feasibility of the alignment set. The selection criteria will be specified in
the next section to enable performance analysis.
5IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we will check how the insight in Sec. II-B
applies to generic wireless-tap networks.
In today’s wireless networks, the randomness in aggregated
interference is largely attributed to the locations of active
interferers [26]. Consequently, to characterize the performance
of wireless networks, researchers have modeled the locations
of nodes using random point processes. To maintain analytical
tractability, homogeneous point processes are usually adopted.
In particular, the homogeneous Poisson point process (PPP) is
widely adopted [27], [28] as it possesses the highest entropy
and accounts for complete randomness in node locations. The
PPP has been used to analyze the connectivity of wireless
networks with secrecy. In this work, PPP is also adopted for
the framework of GIA performance evaluation.
Definition 2 (Stochastic Wireless-tap Network):
• Channel Model: The nodes are distributed in a two-
dimensional infinite plane R2. The channel state between
two nodes positioned at a,b ∈ R2 is given by Ha,b =
L(a,b)H˜a,b, where the elements in H˜ are independent
random variables following complex Gaussian distribu-
tion with zero mean and unit variance and the pathloss
L(a,b) = ||a− b||−α2 I{||a− b||−α2 ≥ θ}, (10)
where α ∈ [2, 4] is the pathloss exponent and θ is the
cutoff threshold.5
• Legitimate user network: The position of the LTs is mod-
eled by a homogeneous PPP with density λ(` ). For an LT
located at b, the position of the associated LR is given by
a = b+pb, where pb is drawn from certain probability
distribution in R2, with ||pb|| ≤ θ− 2α .6 Each LR and
LT is equipped with M (` ) and N (` ) number of antennas,
respectively. Each LT delivers d(` ) (≤ min{M (` ), N (` )})
independent data streams. Denote pa = −pb.
• Legitimate jammer network: The position of the LJs
is modeled by a PPP with density λ(j). Each LJ has
M (j) number of antennas and delivers d(j) (≤ M (j))
independent dummy data streams.
• Eavesdropper network: The position of the ER attempting
to intercept the information from the LT at position b
is given by e = b + p˜b, where p˜b is drawn from
certain probability distribution in R2, with ||p˜b|| ≤ θ− 2α .
Each ER is equipped with N (e) number of antennas
and adopts minimum mean square error decoder. Denote
pe = −p˜b.
For notation convenience, in the following, the position of
a node will be used to replace its index. For example, an LT
positioned at b ∈ R2 is denoted by LT b. Denote the set of
the positions of LTs, LRs, LJs, and ERs by T (` ), R(` ), T (j),
and R(e), respectively.
5Suppose the maximum transmit power of nodes in the network is Pmax.
Then when θ2Pmax  1, the interference that has been ignored by the
pathloss cutoff threshold is insignificant compared to white noise. In this case,
the pathloss model in (10) is a reasonable approximation of the classical one.
The two models will be compared via simulation in Fig. 7.
6Otherwise, from (10), the channel between the LR and the associated LT
is 0, which leads to trivial result. For the same reason, the distance between
LT and the corresponding ER is limited.
To cancel the strongest interference that each LR perceives,
we set the selection criteria in Algorithm 1 so that the nodes
select the nearest neighboring nodes first, i.e.,
• Transmitter side: LT b sets A(t)(b) = {(a,b)}, where
a ∈ R(` )\{b+ pb}, so that
L(a,b) ≥ L(a˜,b), ∀a˜ ∈ R(` )\({a : (a,b) ∈ A(t)(b)} ∪ {b+ pb}), (11)∣∣A(t)(b)∣∣ = ⌊M (x) − d(x)
d(` )
⌋
, m(x), (12)
where x = `, j for the LTs and LJs, respectively.
• Receiver side: LR a sets A(r)(a) = {(a,b(` ))} ∪
{(a,b(j))}, where b(` ) ∈ T (` )\{a + pa}, b(j) ∈ T (j),
so that
(a,b(x)) 6∈ A(t)(b(x)), x ∈ {`, j}, (13)
L(a,b
(x)) ≥ L(a,b), ∀b ∈ (T (` ) ∪ T (j))\({b : (a,b) ∈ A(r)(a) ∪ A(t)(b)} ∪ {a+ pa}), (14)
N (` ) − d(` ) −max{d(` ), d(j)}+ 1 ≤
d(` )
∣∣{(a,b(` ))}∣∣+ d(j)∣∣{(a,b(j))}∣∣ ≤ N (` ) − d(` ). (15)
Define the connection density of the legitimate network and
the jammer network ρ(` ), ρ(j), as the expected number of LTs
or LJs that may interfere with a receiver, i.e.,
ρ(` ) = E
 ∑
b∈T (` )
I{L(a,b) > 0}
 = piθ− 4αλ(` ), (16)
ρ(j) = E
 ∑
b∈T (j)
I{L(a,b) > 0}
 = piθ− 4αλ(j), (17)
where a ∈ R2.
This section focuses on analyzing the sDoF achieved by an
LR. Firstly, a lemma which relates the sDoF to the dimension
of interference at the LRs and ERs is proved.
Lemma 4.1 (SDoF and Dimension of Interference): For LR
a with corresponding ER e, the sDoF defined in (4) is given
by
DS =
[
dim
(S (` ))− dim(S(e))]+, (18)
where S(ι), ι ∈ {`, e} is a subspace of the receiving signal
space of LR or ER, i.e., span
(
U
(` )
a
)
or span
(
U
(e)
e
)
that has no
interference. Furthermore, define S(ι) , dim
(S(ι)), ι ∈ {`, e},
then
S (` ) =
[
d(` ) − d(` )
∑
b∈T (` )
I{L(a,b) > 0 & (a,b) 6∈ A}−
d(j)
∑
b∈T (j)
I{L(a,b) > 0 & (a,b) 6∈ A}
]+
, (19)
S(e) = min
{
d(` ),
[
N (e) − d(` )
∑
b∈T (` )
I{L(e,b) > 0}−
d(j)
∑
b∈T (j)
I{L(e,b) > 0}
]+}
. (20)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B for the proof.
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Fig. 3. Illustration of the correlation between alignment subsets of neighbor-
ing nodes. Consider two LTs (or LJs) positioned at b and b+, respectively,
where  ∈ R2 has a small norm. Events (a,b) ∈ A and (a,b+ ) ∈ A are
correlated as the two transmitters perceive similar neighboring networks.
From Lemma 4.1, to analyze the network’s sDoF, the char-
acterization of S (` ) is necessary. However, this is challenging
for the following reason.
Challenge of Correlated Alignment Set Selection
As illustrated in Fig. 3, the events that the links between
one LR and several neighboring transmitters being in the
alignment setA, e.g., events (a,b) ∈ A and (a,b+) ∈ A
in the figure, are correlated. This fact makes the random
variables I{L(a,b) > 0 & (a,b) 6∈ A} in (19) correlated
and hence makes it difficult to characterize S (` ).
To overcome this challenge, Cauchy–Schwarz inequality
and Chernoff inequality are adopted to bound the effect of
correlated alignment set selection. This result is summarized
by the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2 (Characterization of S (` )): For LR a, define
I (` ) , d(` )
∑
b∈T (` )
(a,b)6∈A(` )(b)
I{L(a,b) > 0}+ d(j)
∑
b∈T (j)
(a,b)6∈A(j)(b)
I{L(a,b) > 0},
(21)
ε ,N (` ) − d(` ) − d(` )∣∣{b ∈ T (` ) : (a,b) ∈ A(r)(a)}∣∣
− d(j)∣∣{b ∈ T (j) : (a,b) ∈ A(r)(a)}∣∣ (22)
Then
S (` ) = min
{
d(` ),
[
N (` ) − I (` ) − ε]+}. (23)
Moreover, ε is bounded within
[
0,max{d(j), d(` )} − 1
]
,
E{I (` )} ∈
[ ∑
x∈{`,j}
[
ρ(x)d(x) − λ
(x)
λ(l)
m(x)d(x)
]+
,
∑
x∈{`,j}[
ρ(x)d(x) − λ
(x)
λ(l)
m(x)d(x)
]+
+
d(x)λ(x)
√
ρ(` )
λ(` )
√
2pi
]
, (24)
S{I (` )} ≤
∑
x∈{`,j}
4λ(x)
√
pimin{m(x), ρ(` )}
λ(l)
(1 +
1
6 min{m(x), ρ(` )} ). (25)
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Fig. 4. Illustration of the sDoF per node described by (27).
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C for the proof.
Solution to Correlated Alignment Set Selection
From (23), the major randomness of S (` ) comes from that
of I (` ). Equations (24) and (25) show that the expectation
of I (` ) scales at O(ρ(` )), while its uncertainty in expecta-
tion and standard deviation both scale at O(
√
ρ(` )). There-
fore, when ρ(` ) is large, the randomness in I (` ) is ignorable
compared to its expectation, i.e., limρ(` )→+∞
I (` )
E{I (` )} = 1.
As will be further discussed in Remark 4.1, this property
allows us to bound the effect of correlated alignment
set selection and obtain an asymptotically accurate sDoF
performance bound.
Based on Lemma 4.2, the following theorem characterizes
the sDoF of the GIA algorithm in a stochastic network.
Theorem 4.1 (Performance of GIA Algorithm): Define in-
dicator R ∈ R as
R = min
{
1− N
(e)
ρ(` )d(` ) + ρ(j)d(j)
,
N (` )−d(` )+
min{m(` )d(` ), ρ(` )d(` )}+min{ρ(j)
ρ(l)
m(j)d(j), ρ(j)d(j)}
ρ(` )d(` ) + ρ(j)d(j)
−1
}
, (26)
When ρ(` ) ≥ 1 and |R| >
√
max{d(` ),d(j)}max{ρ(` ),ρ(j)}(
ρ(` )
)2
d(` )
,
the sDoF per node DS ∈ [0, d(` )] is given by
d(` )
(
I{R > 0}+O
(max{d(` ), d(j)}max{ρ(` ), ρ(j)}(
ρ(` )R
)2
d(` )
))
, (27)
where m(` ), m(j) are defined in (12).
Proof: Please refer to Appendix D for the proof.
Remark 4.1 (Interpretation of Theorem 4.1): Fig. 4 gives an
intuitive illustration of the meaning of the sDoF expression in
(27). This expression partitions the operation region into three
parts according to the value of the indicator R. The sDoF per
LR DS is close to the upper bound d(` ) in the feasible region,
whereas it is close to the lower bound 0 in the infeasible
region. Since the width of the transitory region is on O
√
1
ρ(` )
,
7(27) is asymptotically accurate when ρ(` ) → ∞. This trend
will be shown via simulation in Fig. 8.
In practice, it is interesting to understand how a stochastic
wireless-tap network performs under various network param-
eters. However, in general, as data stream numbers d(` ), d(j)
must be integers, and (26) contains the discontinuous function
b·c, it is difficult to obtain simple insights. To address this
issue, a network with high connection density, i.e., ρ(` )  1,
is analyzed in Appendix E. In this scenario, the width of
the transitory region is ignorable, and hence sDoF per node
DS = d(` ) when indicator R > 0. Define the set of feasible
data streams as {(d(j), d(` )) : R > 0}. Analysis on this
feasible set reveals insights into the role of GIA in secrecy
enhancement, as well as the effect of the network parameters
on the performance of wireless-tap networks. These insights
are summarized in the following two remarks.
Remark 4.2 (Operation Modes of GIA): As illustrated in
Fig. 5, in a wireless-tap network with high connection density,
the set of feasible streams is contained by the region above
the jamming line and below the aligning curve. The jamming
line means that LTs and LJs have generated just enough
interference to occupy the signal space of the ERs, and the
aligning curve indicates that the LTs, LJs, and LRs are on the
cutting edge of being able to align all interference at the LRs.
The slope and the intersection of the jamming line are − ρ(j)
ρ(` )
and N
(e)
ρ(` )
, respectively. The aligning curve is a combination of
a horizontal line and two second order curves. In particular,
when M (j) ≥M (` ) +N (` ), the trapezoid with vertices (0, 0),
(0, M
(` )+N (` )
ρ(` )
), (M (j)−M (` )−N (` ), M (` )+N (` )
ρ(` )
) and (M (j), 0)
lies below the aligning curve. From Fig. 5, GIA has three
operation modes:
• Pure IA mode: When N (e) ≤ N (` ) +M (` ), the LTs and
LRs can generate sufficient interference to jam the ERs
and align all interference at the LRs. The LJs can remain
idle without losing optimality in the sDoF sense.
• Moderate Jamming mode: When N (` )+M (` ) < N (e) ≤
max
{
M (j), N (` ) +M (` )
}
, by adopting a small d(j), the
LJs can help the LTs to jam the ERs without reducing
the sDoF per LR.
• Intensive Jamming mode: When N (e) >
max
{
M (j), N (` ) +M (` )
}
, the LJs need to adopt a
large d(j) to generate sufficient interference to jam the
ERs. As a cost of large d(j), the sDoF per LR d(` )
needs to be reduced so as to align the interference at the
LRs.
Remark 4.3 (Role of Network Parameters): The effects of
network parameters on the sDoF performance of a wireless-tap
network are summarized below.
• LJ density ρ(j): As Fig. 6A shows, larger ρ(j) leads to a
steeper jamming line. This will increase achievable sDoF
per LR if GIA is in the intensive jamming mode.
• LT/LR density ρ(` ): As Fig. 6B shows, larger ρ(` ) flattens
both the jamming line and aligning curve, which reduces
achievable sDoF per LR.
• LJ antenna M (j): As Fig. 6C shows, larger M (j) pushes
the aligning line to the right. This will benefit achievable
sDoF per LR if GIA is in the intensive jamming mode.
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Fig. 5. Analysis of the feasible region of a stochastic wireless-tap network
with high connection density. In this figure, M(j) ≥M (` ) +N (` ).
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Fig. 6. Illustration of how the feasible region of (d(j), d(` )) changes w.r.t.
to network parameters.
• Sum of LT and LR antenna M (` )+N (` ): As Fig. 6D
shows, larger M (` )+N (` ) pushes up the aligning curve,
and hence increases achievable sDoF per LR.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we will perform three numerical tests.
A. Secrecy Rate under Different Strategies
First compare the secrecy rate (defined in (2)) achieved by
the proposed GIA technique with the following three baselines.
• Cooperative jamming (CJ): The LTs and LRs adopt
random transceivers, and the LJs adopt zero-forcing (ZF)
precoders to cancel their interference with the LRs.
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Fig. 7. Secrecy rate as a function of SNR under different schemes. The
network parameters are given by α = 4, θ = 10−2, λ(` ) = 4 × 10−2,
λ(j) = 9 × 10−2, M (` ) = M(j) = 16, N (` ) = 8, N(e) = 32, and
d(` ) = d(j) = 1. The distance between an LT and the associated LR and ER
are given by ||∆a(` )|| = 1 and ||∆a(e)|| = 1.5, respectively.
• Pure IA (IA): The LTs and LRs adopt IA to cancel
interference. The LJs remain idle.
• IA with artificial noise (IAN): The LTs and LRs adopt
IA to cancel interference. The LJs generate artificial noise
by adopting random precoders.
To verify the legitimacy of the pathloss model proposed in
(10), the secrecy rates under channel models with and without
pathloss cutoff are simulated.
Fig. 7 illustrates that the proposed GIA technique achieves
significant performance gain over the baselines. This is be-
cause GIA fully exploits the capability of all legitimate part-
ners to create different amounts of interference at the LRs and
ERs. In particular, the low secrecy rate achieved by the IAN
scheme highlights the challenge of the concurrent effect of
interference.7 From the slope of the secrecy rate under GIA
technique, it can be seen that the sDoF per node is around
0.9. It is not exactly 1 due to the uncertainty term in (27).
Also, it can be seen that the secrecy rate under the two types
of channel models are reasonably close.
B. Width of the Transitory Region
Fig. 8 illustrates the sDoF per node DS as a function of the
indicator R under different network densities. If the region in
which DS ∈ [0.1, 0.9] · d(` ) is used to represent the transitory
region, one can see that the width of this region scales on
O
√
1
ρ(` )
. This fact fits the trend described in Remark 4.1.
C. Resource Allocation between Transmitting and Jamming
So far, LTs and LJs are assumed to have a fixed prior role.
However, their respective roles may overlap: As illustrated
7The secrecy rate under the IAN scheme slightly drops when the SNR
increases. This is because the distance from an LT to the associated LR is
smaller than that to the associated ER, which gives the LR an SNR advantage.
However, when the SNR increases, this advantage is soon jeopardized by the
strong interference from the LJs, which affects both the LRs and ERs.
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Fig. 8. sDoF per node DS as a function of the performance indicator R
under different user densities. The network parameters are given by α = 4,
θ = 10−2, and d(` ) = d(j) = 1. The node density is given by λ(` ) =
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Fig. 9. Conceptual illustration of the effect of the resource allocation between
transmitting and jamming.
in Fig. 9, in a wireless-tap network, if part of the LRs are
deactivated, then from the point of view of the remaining
network nodes, the corresponding LTs effectively become
LJs. This conversion empowers the possibility of allocating
resources between transmitting and jamming. The comparison
between the left and right column of Fig. 9 sketches the effect
of allocating resources between transmitting and jamming: one
can increase the secrecy rate of each LR by having more LTs
deliver dummy information or vice versa. This effect can also
be interpreted from Fig. 6. The operation of turning LTs to
LJs is equivalent to increase ρ(j) and decrease ρ(` ). From
Fig. 6A, B, this operation enlarges the feasible region and
hence increases the sDoF per node at a cost of having less
active LRs.
Fig. 10 illustrates the effect of resource allocation between
transmitting and jamming. We fix the sum of the density of
the LTs and LJs, i.e., λ(` ) + λ(j), and illustrate the sDoF
per node DS, or per unit area DSλ(` ) as functions of the
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Fig. 10. sDoF per node/unit area as a function of active LR density λ(` ). The network parameters are given by α = 4, θ = 10−2, λ(` ) ∈ [1×10−2, 9×10−2],
λ(j) = 13× 10−2 − λ(` ), and M (` ) = M(j) = 16.
density of LTs λ(` ) (note that this is also the density of active
LRs). Under each active LR density, all the possible stream
combinations (d(j), d(` )) are exhaustively searched to pick out
the combination that gives the highest DS. From the left
column of Fig. 10, it can be observed that sDoF per node DS is
higher, with larger N (` ) and smaller N (e) or λ(` ). These trends
are consistent with those indicated in Remark 4.2 and 4.3.
From the right column of Fig. 10, in terms of sDoF per unit
area, one can roughly separate the operation region into two
parts, namely the sparse region and the crowded region. In the
sparse region, the benefit from more active LRs dominates, and
hence the sDoF per unit area DSλ(` ) increases under larger
λ(` ).8 In the crowded region, the loss from smaller sDoF per
node DS dominates, and hence DSλ(` ) becomes a decreasing
function of λ(` ). Therefore, in practice, it is important to
control active LR density so that the network operates in a
favorable region.
VI. SUMMARY
By creating strong interference at the ERs but little or
no interference at the LRs, the GIA technique provides an
effective tool for wireless secrecy protection. Based on the
theoretical framework established in Part I, in this part, we
designed a GIA algorithm that is applicable to large-scale
networks and characterized the performance of this algorithm
in stochastic wireless-tap networks. We have identified the
working modes of GIA and obtained simple insights into
how network parameters affect the performance of wireless-
tap networks that adopt the GIA technique. Numerical results
illustrate the contribution of GIA in wireless secrecy protection
and confirms the obtained insights.
8 This fact is not always true due to the discrete choices of (d(j), d(` )).
For instance, the steep drop indicated in the figure occurs when d(` ) changes
from 2 to 1. The discrete choices of (d(j), d(` )) make the sDoF lines rough
in some operation regions.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
From Theorem 4.4 of Part I, one only need to show that ma-
trix Hall (defined in Fig. 4 of Part I) is full row-rank. Suppose
Problem 2.1 is feasible under alignment subsets {A(r)(k)} and
{A(t)(j)}. If the intersection of some alignment subsets are
non-empty, e.g., A(r)(k) ∩ A(t)(j) 6= ∅, then non-overlapping
alignment subset A˜(r)(k) = A(r)(k)\(A(r)(k) ∩ A(t)(j))
can be generated. From Corollary 4.1 of Part I, since this
operation does not change the alignment set A, the feasibility
of Problem 2.1 is preserved. Hence, to prove the theorem, it
is sufficient to consider the case in which
A(r)(k) ∩ A(t)(j) = ∅, ∀k, j. (28)
From equations (9) and (28), every (k, j) ∈ A belongs to
one and only one alignment subset. Hence, one can reorder
the rows of Hall and rewrite the matrix as
diag(HU1 , . . . ,H
U
K ,H
V
1 , . . . ,H
V
K˜
) + H˜all, (29)
where
HUk =
H
U
kj1
...
HUkjS
 , (k, js) ∈ A(r)(k), S = |A(r)(k)|, (30)
HVj =
H
V
k1j
...
HVkSj
 , (ks, j) ∈ A(t)(j), S = |A(t)(j)|, (31)
and the submatrices in H˜all are given by
HUkj : (k, j) 6∈ A(r)(k), and HVkj : (k, j) 6∈ A(t)(j). (32)
Substituting the condition of proper alignment subset, i.e., (8),
to the expressions of HUkj and H
V
kj , i.e., equations (9) and (10)
of Part I, we get that matrices HUk and H
V
j in (30) and (31)
are full row-rank almost surely. Hence, diag(HU1 , . . . ,H
V
K˜
) is
full row-rank almost surely. Moreover, from equations (9) and
10
(10) of Part I, the elements in different submatrices HUkj , H
V
kj
are independent. Hence (32) assures that H˜all is independent
of diag(HU1 , . . . ,H
V
K˜
). Therefore, from (29), Hall is full row-
rank almost surely. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 4.1
As the entries of the channel matrices are independent
random variables drawn from continuous distributions, with
probability 1,
r(ι) = S(ι) log2(P ) + O(log2 P ) (33)
Substituting this result to (2),
RS =
[
S (` ) − S(e)]+ log2(P ) + O(log2 P ) (34)
Substituting (34) to (4), (18) is obtained. In the following, the
expression of S (` ) and S(e) will be derived.
If a link between LR a and LT (or LJ) b has zero pathloss,
i.e., L(a,b) = 0, or (a,b) ∈ A, there is no interference
on this link. Otherwise, the channel state H(` )a,b is indepen-
dent of U(` )a ,Vb. In this case, rank
((
U
(` )
a
)H
Ha,bVb
)
=
min{d(` ), d(x)} almost surely, where x = ` for LTs and x = j
for LJs. Hence, with probability 1, S (` ) is given by (19).
Similarly, as the channel state of the eavesdropping network
{H(e)eb} is independent of precoders {Vb}, (20) is obtained.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 4.2
First prove (23). A = (∪a∈R(` )A(r)(a)) ∪(∪b∈T (` )A(t)(b)) ∪ (∪b∈T (j)A(j)(b)). From (13), the
sets ∪a∈R(` )A(r)(a), ∪b∈T (` )A(t)(b), and ∪b∈T (j)A(j)(b) do
not overlap. Hence,∑
b∈T (x)
I{L(a,b) > 0 & (a,b) 6∈ A} =∑
b∈T (x)
(a,b) 6∈A(x)(b)
I{L(a,b) > 0} −
∑
b∈T (x)
(a,b)∈A(r)(a)
I{L(a,b) > 0}, (35)
where x ∈ {`, j}. Substituting (21) and (35) to (19),
S (` ) =
[
N (` ) − I (` ) − ε˜]+, (36)
where ε˜ = d(` )
∑
b∈T (` )
(a,b)∈A(r)(a)
I{L(a,b) > 0} +
d(j)
∑
b∈T (j)
(a,b)∈A(r)(a)
I{L(a,b) > 0}. From (22), ε˜ ≤ ε. More-
over, from (11) and (14), if ε˜ < ε,
{
b ∈ T (` )∪T (j)\{a+pa} :
L(a,b) > 0
} ⊆ A, which means S (` ) = d(` ). With this fact
and (36),(23) is obtained.
From (15), it is easy to see that ε is bounded within[
0,max{d(j), d(` )} − 1]. Hence, in the following, the focus
is on characterizing the mean and variance of I (` ). Define
i(x) ,
∑
b∈T (x)
(a,b)6∈A(x)(b)
I{L(a,b) > 0}, x ∈ {`, j}, then
I (` ) = d(` )i(` ) + d(j)i(j). (37)
To analyze the mean and variance of I (` ), we first analyze
those of i(x), x ∈ {`, j}. To achieve this task, a characteriza-
tion the spatial distribution of LRs is needed.
Lemma C.1 (Spatial Distribution of LRs): In a stochastic
network, as described by Definition 2, the position of the LRs
is given by a PPP with density λ(` ).
Proof: From the second item in Definition 2, the position
of the LRs is a transformation of that of the LTs, which is
a PPP with density λ(` ). Hence, from [29, Thm. 1.3.9], the
position of the LRs is also a PPP with density λ(a), a ∈ R2,
where
λ(a) =
∫
R2
p
(
∆a(` )
)
λ(` )d
(
∆a(` )
)
= λ(` ). (38)
Here p(x) denotes the probability density function of x. This
completes the proof.
First analyze the expectation i(x). For LR a, the positions of
the unassociated LTs are given by a homogeneous PPP with
density λ(` ) on R2\{a+ pa}. Hence
E
{
i(x)
}
=
∫ θ−2/α
0
2pirλ(x) Pr
{
(a,b) 6∈ A(x)∣∣
b ∈ T (x), ||a− b|| = r
}
dr. (39)
From Lemma C.1,
Pr
{
(a,b) 6∈ A(x)∣∣b ∈ T (x), ||a− b|| = r}
= 1−Pr
{∣∣{a′ : a′∈ R(` ), ||a′ − b|| < r}∣∣ ≤ m(x)−1}(40)
= 1− Γ(m
(x), pir2λ(` ))
Γ(m(x))
. (41)
Substitute (41) to (39):
E
{
i(x)
}
= piθ−
4
αλ(x) − 2piλ
(x)
Γ(m(x))
∫ θ−2/α
0
rΓ(m(x), pir2λ(` ))dr
= ρ(x) − λ
(x)
λ(` )
m(x) − λ
(x)
λ(` )
(ρ(` ) −m(x))Γ(m(x), ρ(` ))− (ρ(` ))m(x)e−ρ(` )
Γ(m(x))
. (42)
From [30, 8.11.2],
lim
ρ(` )→+∞
(ρ(` ) −m(x))Γ(m(x), ρ(` ))− (ρ(` ))m(x)e−ρ(` )
Γ(m(x))
= 0. (43)
By combining (40), (42), and (43),
− λ
(x)
λ(` )
(ρ(` ) −m(x))Γ(m(x), ρ(` ))− (ρ(` ))m(x)e−ρ(` )
Γ(m(x))
=∫ +∞
θ−2/α
2pirλ(x)Pr
{∣∣{a′ : a′∈ R(` ), ||a′−b|| < r}∣∣ ≤ m(x)−1}
dr,
which is a positive, increasing function of m(x). Hence, when
m(x) ≤ ρ(` ), E{i(x)} is in interval[
ρ(x) − λ
(x)
λ(` )
m(x), ρ(x) − λ
(x)
λ(` )
m(x) +
λ(x)
λ(` )
(ρ(` ))ρ
(` )
e−ρ
(` )
Γ(ρ(` ))
]
⊆
[
ρ(x) − λ
(x)
λ(` )
m(x), ρ(x) − λ
(x)
λ(` )
m(x) +
λ(x)
√
ρ(` )
λ(` )
√
2pi
]
. (44)
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(44) is true because, from Stirling’s formula [30, 5.11.7],√
2pi
z
(z)ze−z ≤ Γ(z) ≤
√
2pi
z
(z)ze−z(1 +
1
12z
) (45)
Further noting that E
{
i(x)
}
is a nonnegative decreasing
function of m(x), we have E
{
i(x)
}
is in interval[[
ρ(x) − λ
(x)
λ(` )
m(x)
]+
,[
ρ(x) − λ
(x)
λ(` )
m(x)
]+
+
λ(x)
√
ρ(` )
λ(` )
√
2pi
]
. (46)
We then start to bound the variance of i(x). To address the
challenge of correlated alignment set selection, the following
lemma is proposed.
Lemma C.2 (Bound of the Variance of the Sum of Random
Variables): {x1, . . . , xn} are random variables in R. Then
S
{
n∑
i=1
xi
}
≤
n∑
i=1
S{xi}. (47)
Proof: Denote x¯i = E{xi}, then
V
{
n∑
i=1
xi
}
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
E{(xi − x¯i)(xj − x¯j)}
≤
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
√
E{(xi − x¯i)2}E{(xj − x¯j)2}(48)
=
(
n∑
i=1
S{xi}
)2
, (49)
where (48) is true due to the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality. This
completes the proof.
From Lemma C.2,
S
{
i(x)
}
≤
∫ θ−2/α
0
2pirλ(x)S
(
Pr
{
(a,b) 6∈ A(x)∣∣a ∈ R(` ),
b ∈ T (x), ||a− b|| = r
})
dr
=
∫ θ−2/α
0
2pirλ(x)S
(
Pr
{∣∣∣{a′ : a′ ∈ R(` ),
||a′ − b|| < r}
∣∣∣ ≥ m(x)})dr, (50)
where function S(p) =
√
p(1− p), p ∈ [0, 1].
Denote Pr(r,m(x)) = Pr
{∣∣{a′ : a′ ∈ R(` ), ||a′−b|| < r}∣∣
≥ m(x)
}
. If m(x) = 0, Pr(r,m(x)) = 1, ∀r ≥ 0. Hence
V
{
i(x)
}
= 0. Otherwise, when m(x) ≥ 1, variable ∣∣{a′ : a′ ∈
R(` ), ||a′ − b|| < r}∣∣ follows Poisson distribution with mean
pir2λ(` ). Hence, from Chernoff inequality,
Pr(r,m(x))≤ e
−pir2λ(` )(epir2λ(` ))m(x)(
m(x))m
(x) , when: r ≤ R =
√
m(x)
piλ(` )
,
Pr(r,m(x))≥ 1− e
−pir2λ(` )(epir2λ(` ))m(x)(
m(x))m
(x) , when: r ≥ R.
(51)
Then S
{
i(x)
}
will be bounded by separating the operation
region into the following two cases:
Case 1: R ≤ θ−2/α (i.e., m(x) ≤ ρ(` )). Substitute (51) to
(50), noting that S(p) ≤ min{√p,√1− p}, we have
S
{
i(x)
}≤2piλ(x)(∫ R
0
rS
(
Pr(r,m(x))
)
dr+
∫ θ−2/α
R
rS
(
Pr(r,m(x))
)
dr
)
≤2piλ(x)
∫ θ−2/α
0
re
−pir2λ(` )
2
(
epir2λ(` )
)m(x)
2(
m(x))
m(x)
2
dr
≤−2piλ(x) (2e)
m(x)
2 Γ(m
(x)
2 + 1,
piλ(` )r2
2 )
piλ(` )
(
m(x))
m(x)
2
∣∣∣∣+∞
0
≤ 4λ
(x)
√
pim(x)
λ(l)
(1 +
1
6m(x)
), (52)
where last inequality is true because of (45).
Case 2: R > θ−2/α (i.e., m(x) > ρ(` )). First, prove the
following lemma.
Lemma C.3: When r ∈
[
0, R˜
]
, Pr(r,m(x)) ≤ 12 , where
R˜ =
√
m(x) − 13
piλ(` )
.
Proof: Since
∣∣{a′ : a′ ∈ R(` ), ||a′−b|| < r}∣∣ is Poisson
random variable with mean pir2λ(` ), from [31, Thm. 2], when
pir2λ(` ) + 13 ≤ m(x), Pr(r,m(x)) ≤ 12 . This completes the
proof.
Lemma C.4: When r ∈
(
R˜, R
]
and ρ(` ) ≥ 23 f(r, ρ(` )) ,
e−pir
2λ(` )
(
epir2λ(` )
)ρ(` )(
ρ(` ))ρ
(` ) >
1
2 .
Proof: Note that when r ≤ R,
∂f
∂r
=
e−pir
2λ(` )
(
epir2λ(` )
)ρ(` )(
ρ(` ))ρ
(` )
(−2pirλ(` ) + 2ρ
(` )
r
) ≥ 0, (53)
it can be seen that when r ∈
(
R˜, R
]
,
f(r, ρ(` )) > f(R˜, ρ(` )) > e
ρ(` ) ln(1− 1
3ρ(` )
)
. (54)
Noting that ρ(` ) ≥ 23 ,
∂ρ(` ) ln(1− 1
3ρ(` )
)
∂ρ(` )
= ln(1− 1
3ρ(` )
) +
1
3ρ(` ) − 1
> −
+∞∑
n=1
(
1
3ρ(` )
)n
+
1
3ρ(` ) − 1 = 0 (55)
Substitute (55) to (54), we have f(r, ρ(` )) > f(R˜, 23 ) > (1−
1
2 )
2
3 > 12 . This completes the proof.
With the two lemmas proved above, it can be seen that
S
{
i(x)
}
≤ 2piλ(x)
(∫ min{R˜,θ−2/α}
0
rS
(
Pr(r,m(x))
)
dr +
∫ θ−2/α
min{R˜,θ−2/α}
rS
(
Pr(r,m(x))
)
dr
)
≤ 2piλ(x)
(∫ min{R˜,θ−2/α}
0
rS
(
Pr(r, ρ(` ))
)
dr +
∫ θ−2/α
min{R˜,θ−2/α}
r/2dr
)
(56)
12
≤ 2piλ(x)
∫ θ−2/α
0
re
−pir2λ(` )
2
(
epir2λ(` )
) ρ(` )
2(
ρ(` ))
ρ(` )
2
dr (57)
≤ 4λ
(x)
√
piρ(` )
λ(l)
(1 +
1
6ρ(` )
), (58)
where (56) is true because of Lemma C.3 and the facts that (a)
S
(
Pr(r,m(x))
)
is a decreasing function of m(x), (b) S(p) =√
p(1− p) is a increasing function in [0, 12 ] and (c) S(p) ≤ 12 ;
(57) is true because of Lemma C.4 and m(x) ≥ 1.
From (52) and (58),
S
{
i(x)
}≤ 4λ(x)√pimin{m(x), ρ(` )}
λ(l)
(1+
1
6 min{m(x), ρ(` )} ).
(59)
From (37), (46), and (59), (24) and (25) are obtained.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1
From Lemma 4.1, to characterize DS, it is necessary to char-
acterize S (` ) and S(e). Since S (` ) is addressed by Lemma 4.2,
the focus is on S(e).
Lemma D.1 (Characterization of S(e)): S(e) =
min
{
d(` ), [N (e) − I(e)]+}, where I(e) =
d(` )
∑
b∈T (` ) I{L(e,b) > 0} + d(j)
∑
b∈T (j) I{L(e,b) > 0},
E{I(e)} = ρ(` )d(` ) + ρ(j)d(j) and V{I(e)} =
ρ(` )
(
d(` )
)2
+ ρ(j)
(
d(j)
)2
.
Proof: The position of LTs and LJs are given by
PPPs with density λ(` ) and λ(j), respectively. Hence,∑
b∈T (` ) I{L(e,b) > 0} and d(j)
∑
b∈T (j) I{L(e,b) > 0}
are independent random variables following Poisson distribu-
tion, with parameters ρ(` ) and ρ(j), respectively. From the
properties of Poisson distribution and (20), Lemma D.1 is
proved.
Now start the main flow of the proof of Theorem 4.1.
When R(e) = 1 − N(e)
ρ(` )d(` )+ρ(j)d(j)
>√
max{d(` ),d(j)}max{ρ(` ),ρ(j)}(
ρ(` )
)2
d(` )
, from Lemma D.1 and
Chebyshev inequality,
Pr{S(e) ≥ 0} ≤ ρ
(` )
(
d(` )
)2
+ ρ(j)
(
d(j)
)2(
R(e)
)2(
ρ(` )d(` ) + ρ(j)d(j)
)2
<
max
{
d(` ), d(j)
}
max
{
ρ(` ), ρ(j)
}(
R(e)ρ(` )
)2
d(` )
. (60)
Otherwise, when R(e) < −
√
max{d(` ),d(j)}max{ρ(` ),ρ(j)}(
ρ(` )
)2
d(` )
,
noting that ρ(` ) ≥ 1,
Pr{S(e) ≥ d(` )}
≥ 1− ρ
(` )
(
d(` )
)2
+ ρ(j)
(
d(j)
)2(
R(e)
(
ρ(` )d(` ) + ρ(j)d(j)
)
+ d(` )
)2
≥ 1− ρ
(` )
(
d(` )
)2
+ ρ(j)
(
d(j)
)2(
R(e)
(
ρ(` )d(` ) + ρ(j)d(j)
))2 +
2
(
ρ(` )
(
d(` )
)2
+ ρ(j)
(
d(j)
)2)
d(` )(
R(e)
(
ρ(` )d(` ) + ρ(j)d(j)
))3
∼ 1−O
(
max
{
d(` ), d(j)
}
max
{
ρ(` ), ρ(j)
}(
R(e)ρ(` )
)2
d(` )
)
. (61)
Similarly, from Lemma 4.2 and
Chebyshev inequality, when R(` ) =
N (` )−d(` )+min{m(` )d(` ),ρ(` )d(` )}+min{λ(j)
λ(l)
m(j)d(j),ρ(j)d(j)}
ρ(` )d(` )+ρ(j)d(j)
− 1 >√
max{d(` ),d(j)}max{ρ(` ),ρ(j)}(
ρ(` )
)2
d(` )
,
Pr{S (` ) < d(` )} ∼ O
(
max
{
d(` ), d(j)
}
max
{
ρ(` ), ρ(j)
}(
R(e)ρ(` )
)2
d(` )
)
, (62)
and when R(` ) < −
√
max{d(` ),d(j)}max{ρ(` ),ρ(j)}(
ρ(` )
)2
d(` )
,
Pr{S (` ) ≥ 0} ∼ 1−O
(
max
{
d(` ),d(j)
}
max
{
ρ(` ),ρ(j)
}(
R(e)ρ(` )
)2
d(` )
)
. (63)
Substituting (60)–(63) to (18), (27) is obtained.
APPENDIX E
FEASIBLE REGION UNDER HIGH CONNECTION DENSITY
When ρ(` )  1, the feasible streams (d(j), d(` )) ∈{
0, . . . ,M (j)
}× {1, . . . ,min{N (` ),M (` )}} need to satisfy
R = min{R(e), R(` )} > 0, where (64)
R(e) = 1− N
(e)
ρ(` )d(` ) + ρ(j)d(j)
, (65)
R(` ) =
N (` )−d(` ) + min{m(` )d(` ), ρ(` )d(` )}
ρ(` )d(` ) + ρ(j)d(j)
+ min{ρ(j)
ρ(l)
m(j)d(j), ρ(j)d(j)}
− 1. (66)
Define
R˜(` ) =
N (` ) + min{M (` ), ρ(` )d(` )}+
ρ(` )d(` ) + ρ(j)d(j)
min{ρ(j)(M(j)−d(j))
ρ(` )d(` )
d(j), ρ(j)d(j)}
− 1. (67)
Since the quantization error of the b·c function is bounded by
(−1, 0], by substituting (12) to (66), we get
∣∣∣R(` ) − R˜(` )∣∣∣ ≤ 2d(` ) + ρ(j)ρ(` ) d(j)
ρ(` )d(` ) + ρ(j)d(j)
≤ 2
ρ(` )
. (68)
Hence, the difference between R(` ) and R˜(` ) is ignorable when
ρ(` )  1. Therefore, one can replace R(` ) by R˜(` ) in (64).
After this replacement, (64) is equivalent to the following four
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inequalities:
f1(d
(j), d(` )) = ρ(` )d(` ) + ρ(j)d(j) −N (e) > 0, (69)
f2(d
(j), d(` )) = ρ(` )d(` ) −N (` ) −M (` ) < 0, (70)
f3(d
(j), d(` )) =
(
ρ(` )
)2(
d(` )
)2
+ ρ(` )ρ(j)d(` )d(j) + ρ(j)
(
d(j)
)2−
(M (` ) +N (` ))ρ(` )d(` ) −M (j)ρ(j)d(j) < 0, (71)
f4(d
(j), d(` )) = ρ(` )ρ(j)d(` )d(j) + ρ(j)
(
d(j)
)2 −N (` )ρ(` )d(` )
−M (j)ρ(j)d(j) < 0. (72)
It is easy to see that f1(d(j), d(` )) = 0 is a line with
slope − ρ(j)
ρ(` )
and intersection N
(e)
ρ(` )
, and f2(d(j), d(` )) = 0 is
a horizontal line with intersection M
(` )+N (` )
ρ(` )
. However, as
f3(d
(j), d(` )) = 0 and f4(d(j), d(` )) = 0 are second order
curves, it is difficult to give a simple characterization of the
feasible region. On the other hand, noting that
– f3(d(j), d(` )) = 0 passes through points (0, 0),
(0, M
(` )+N (` )
ρ(` )
), (max{M (j) − M (` ) − N (` ), 0},
M (` )+N (` )
ρ(` )
) and (M (j), 0),
– f4(d(j), d(` )) = 0 passes through points (0, 0), (M (j), 0),
we have the following proposition to summarize the property
of f2(d(j), d(` )), f3(d(j), d(` )) and f4(d(j), d(` )).
Proposition E.1 (Properties of the Feasible Region): When
M (j) ≥ M (` ) + N (` ), the points (d(j), d(` )) in the interior of
trapezoid with vertices (0, 0), (0, M
(` )+N (` )
ρ(` )
), (M (j)−M (` )−
N (` ), M
(` )+N (` )
ρ(` )
) and (M (j), 0) satisfy (70)–(72).
Proof: Noting that function f(x) = a+xb+x , with a, b ≥ 0
and x ∈ [0,+∞) is a strictly decreasing function when
f(x) > 1 (i.e., a > b), from (67), R˜(` ) is an strictly decreasing
function of d(j) and d(` ) when R˜(` ) > 0. Further noting
that (70)–(72) ⇔ R˜(` ) > 0, if (70)–(72) hold for certain
data stream configuration (d(j), d(` )), then for any (d˜(j), d˜(` ))
satisfying d˜(j) ≤ d(j) and d˜(` ) ≤ d(` ), (70)–(72) must hold.
Therefore, to prove the proposition, one only need to prove
that fi(d(j), d(` )) ≤ 0, i ∈ {2, 3, 4} for all points on the line
segment with end points (M (j) − M (` ) − N (` ), M (` )+N (` )
ρ(` )
)
and (M (j), 0). Since on this line segment, d(` ) ≤ M (` )+N (` )
ρ(` )
,
it is clear that f2(d(j), d(` )) ≤ 0. This line segment can be
expressed as
d(` ) =
M (j) − d(j)
ρ(` )
, d(j) ∈ {M (j) −M (` ) −N (` ),M (j)}. (73)
Substitute (73) into (71) and (72),
f3(d
(j), d(` )) =(d(j) −M (j))(d(j) +N (` ) +M (` ) −M (j)),
f4(d
(j), d(` )) =N (` )(d(j) −M (j)).
Hence, when d(j) ∈ {M (j) − M (` ) − N (` ),M (j)},
fi(d
(j), d(` )) ≤ 0, i ∈ {3, 4}. This completes the proof.
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